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THE ROLE OF TRUST IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
RONALD J. COLOMBO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A

objective, of financial regulaand a perennial
justification,
perennial
tory
reform
is the restoration
of trust and confidence in the marketplace for financial products and services.' From the 1933 and 1934 securities Acts, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the reform proposals
circulating Washington, D.C. (and indeed, much of the world) today, it
has been argued that increased, or improved, regulation is necessary in
order to counter flagging trust and confidence in the financial markets
and the institutions that operate in those markets. 2
Thanks to a decade or so of important research on the phenomenon
of trust, we are now in a position to critically examine this argument. That
is, does increased regulation, and increased regulatory oversight, actually
enhance investor trust and confidence in the financial markets?
The answer is: it depends. For trust comes in a variety of forms, and
different forms of trust respond to regulation in different ways. Some
forms of trust can, indeed, be enhanced by additional regulation. Other
forms of trust, however, can be damaged by additional regulation. So,
rather than regulate first, and ask questions later, the wise policy maker
will make sure that he or she has identified the form of trust at issue in a
given situation before proposing or implementing regulation aimed at restoring it.

Since the past serves as a prologue,3 this Article shall survey traditional U.S. approaches to financial regulation-the three pillars of which
are banking regulation, insurance regulation, and securities regulation. It
shall explore the extent to which the existing regulatory approaches further or undermine trust, based on what trust literature tells us. This shall

set the groundwork for future work delving more deeply into each of these
areas and, moreover, examining current regulatory reform proposals.
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like
to thank the Villanova University School of Law's first annual Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius Symposium on Securities Regulation for inviting me to present an earlier
draft of this Article, and for the helpful feedback and suggestions received
therefrom. I would also like to extend my thanks tojamie Feldman,Jennifer Riley,
and Drew Summer for their most helpful research assistance.
1. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the DisclosureAntidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139,
140-41 (2006).
2. SeeJohn H. Walsh, A Simple Code ofEthics: A History ofthe Moral PurposeInspiring FederalRegulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1015, 1036 (2001).
3. See WiuiAM SHAKEsPEARE, THE TEMPEST, 59 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale University Press 2006) (1610).
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Of course, as my symposium colleagues have aptly demonstrated,
there are a variety of reasons why governments regulate the financial services industry. Significant among these are the need to protect investors
and consumers of financial products, 4 and the need to control for systemic risk.5 Nevertheless, restoration, and/or maintenance of trust and
confidence in the market for financial services remain paramount concerns as well. Although a prudent policy maker would take all such objectives into account, this Article shall focus solely on the goal of restoring
and/or maintaining trust.
This Article shall proceed as follows: Part II will explain the importance of trust-why it has been, and should remain, a focus of financial
services regulation. Part III will explore the nature of trust, identifying the
critical dichotomy between affective versus cognitive trust, and why the
former responds poorly to regulation whereas the latter responds favorably. Part IV will summarize the general regulatory approach to banking,
insurance, and securities regulation in the United States, and critique
each approach in light of the scholarship on trust. The Article will conclude that, whether by design or chance, existing financial services regulation in the U.S. generally comports well with our understanding of trust.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST

Over the past decade or so, an increasing number of experts have
come to recognize, and explicitly identify, trust as an essential component
of a properly functioning economy and society. Of particular importance
are three books on the subject: in chronological order, Francis Fukuyama,
Trust,6 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone,' and, Tamar Frankel, Trust and
Honesty.8 Each of these books forcefully propounds the thesis that the
economy and the world as we know it simply could not function without a
certain degree of trust.9
4. See Ann Graham, The Consumer FinancialProtection Agency: Love It or Hate It,
U.S. FinancialRegulation Needs It, 55 VILL. L. REv. 603 (2010); Anita K. Krug, Moving
Beyond the Clamorfor "Hedge Fund Regulation": A Reconsideration of "Client" Under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 55 VILL. L. REv. 661 (2010); Arthur Laby, Fiduciary
Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REv. 701 (2010).
5. See Eric J. Pan, FourChallenges to FinancialRegulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REv.

743 (2010).
6. FRANcIs
PERITY (1995).

FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROS-

7. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF THE
AMERICAN COMMUNrTY (2000).
8. TAMAR

FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY

(2006).

9. See generally id.; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the BehavioralFoundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735 (2001);
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEo. L.J. 1457 (2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Trust and Team Production in Post-CapitalistSociety, 24J. CORP. L. 869 (1999). Other
important works address trust within the larger context of social capital. See, e.g.,
FUKUYAMA, supra note 6; PUTNAM, supra note 7.
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A few years ago, Alan Greenspan remarked: "[O]ur market system
depends critically on trust-trust in the word of our colleagues and trust
in the word of those with whom we do business."1 0 This captures not only
Greenspan's thinking, but the thinking of many, if not most, who have
considered the issue.11
Why is trust so critical? There are many reasons, but of these two
appear particularly important.
The first is that transaction costs (including agency costs) become extraordinarily high in the absence of trust.1 2 If each and every transaction
must be accompanied by measures and mechanisms to ensure honesty and
reliability, things get very expensive. These transaction costs are a "deadweight loss" to the economy, reducing efficiency and thwarting wealth
maximization. 1 3
Moreover, in some situations, transaction costs may actually eclipse
any potential gain, thereby depriving the economy of an exchange that
would have been a value-generating and mutually beneficial
undertaking. 14
Second, relationships characterized by trust give rise to greater opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange.' 5 Counterparties who trust one
another are more likely to "open up," divulging thoughts and information
beyond what is necessary to divulge in order to complete a given transaction.1 6 This greater knowledge of one another can lead to the discovery of
additional avenues of exchange between the parties.1 7
10. R. William Ide, III & Douglas H. Yam, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A
Trust-GeneratingInstitution for an Age of CorporateIllegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56
VAND. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (2003) (quoting Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy
Report for 2002: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking Hous. and Urban Affairs,
107th Cong. 44 (2002) (statement of Alan Greenspan)).
11. In fact, as this Article was being written, two new, significant articles on
Trust were posted to the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). See Raymond
H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior and FinancialRe-Regulation, 57 Bur.
L. REv. 1361 (2009); Lynn Stout, Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities
Markets (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-15), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1442023##.
12. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in
MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITIcAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONouv 28, 239 (Paul J.
Zak ed., 2008). I have previously addressed the issue of transaction costs and, generally, the need for virtue (not simply trust). See Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing The
Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 737 (2009).
13. See Goodenough, supra note 12, at 239; Tamar Frankel, Trust and NonTrusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REv. 457, 460-63 (2001).
14. See Frankel, supra note 13, at 460-63.
15. See Christel Lane, Introduction, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 1, 20 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (citing L.G. Zucker,
Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920, 8 RES. IN
ORG. BEHAv. 53 (1986)).
16. See id. at 20 (citations omitted).
17. See id.
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OF TRUST

Before delving into the nature of trust, it would be helpful to set forth
a working definition of "trust." The one employed by most scholars is
fairly straight-forward: trust is the willingness to make one's self vulnerable
to another.' 8 It represents a leap of faith-a decision to go forward in a
relationship while recognizing the fact that your counterparty has an opportunity to cause you harm.' 9
But this leap of faith can be justified in a variety of ways-and hence
trust's variety of forms. For the justification to trust can be primarily emotional, almost instinctual; or it can be primarily intellectual, and calculative. These two modes of justification form poles on a continuum,
bounded by "affective" trust on one end, and "cognitive" trust on the
other.
"Affective trust" is that form of trust that most people probably think
of when they hear the word "trust." It represents trust that is emotional in
nature, predicated upon shared experiences, histories, or values. 20 It is
the trust that exists between family members, members of the same religious community (especially if it's a tight-knit religious community), and
that sometimes develops between co-workers or classmates over time. 2 ' It
is usually developed over many years, by repeated, interpersonal interactions in which the parties prove, to an increasing degree, their trustworthiness to one another. 22
Affective trust is the "gold standard" of trust. It is the form of trust
that tolerates the least amount of suspicion, inspires the greatest amount
of honesty and sacrifice, and exhibits the greatest resiliency in challenging
and unfortunate situations. 23
The opposite of affective trust is "cognitive trust." Some theorists argue that "cognitive trust" is not even "trust" (as that word is popularly understood) at all. 24 Cognitive trust is confidence in another's word and/or
ability based upon a cost-benefit analysis of a given situation. 25 Cognitive
trust is not predicated upon emotion, but rather, upon calculation. 26 In a
relationship characterized by cognitive trust, the trusting party weighs the
18. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 1739-40.
19. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84

WASH.

U. L.R. 1717, 1724 (2006).
20. See Cross, supra note 9, at 1464.
21. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,

36J.L. & EcoN. 453, 479 (1993).
22. See id.

23. See Lane, supra note 15, at 23; Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 1750-51, 175659 (extolling benefits of "trust," which authors have defined as "intemalized [affective] trust and not calculative behavior [cognitive trust]"); Hill & O'Hara, supra
note 19, at 1725-26; Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553, 560-63
(2001).
24. See Williamson, supra note 21, at 463.
25. See Cross, supra note 9, at 1465.
26. See id.
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potential benefits of pursuing a transaction with the counterparty in question, against the potential costs of being defrauded, or otherwise dissatisfied with the performance of that counterparty.2 7 In assessing the
likelihood of being defrauded by, or otherwise dissatisfied with, the
counterparty in question, the trusting party takes into account everything
that he or she knows about a potential counterparty-his or her reputation, education, background, past performance, and the like. 28
Cognitive trust is not particularly resilient, but rather, quite dynamic-it increases or decreases as additional information is learned
about the trustworthiness, ability, etc., of one's counterparty. Moreover,
whereas affective trust serves to reduce transaction costs, thereby promoting efficiency, cognitive trust, to the contrary, is often purchased via the
imposition of considerable transaction costs (such as negotiated contractual strictures, monitoring devices, and the like). 2 9 This is why, all things
being equal, affective trust is preferable to relationships (and to society)
than cognitive trust.3 0
It is highly unlikely that trust exists in either a purely affective or cognitive form, which is why most understand the nature of trust as falling
somewhere on a continuum between these two poles.31 Even a relationship marked by high levels of affective trust is likely to contain a touch of
cognitive trust mixed in as well, and vice-versa. 32
Identification of the form of trust implicated in a given relationship is
important because, among other things, it enables us to predict the likely
effects of law and regulation upon such relationships. This is because different forms of trust react differently to the imposition of legal rules and
regulation.
Research has suggested that although law and regulation can serve to
bolster trust that is primarily cognitive in nature,3 3 it can, conversely, undermine trust that is primarily affective in nature. 34
Perhaps the beneficial effects of law and regulation upon cognitive
trust are the easiest to appreciate. After all, cognitive trust essentially boils
down to a cost-benefit analysis; a calculation of risk given a specific set of
facts and circumstances. Here, law and regulation serve as factors that
(one would hope!) decrease the risk of fraud, incompetence, and other
27. See

Hill &

O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1725.

28. See id.

29. See id. at 1752.
30. See Lane, supra note 15, at 23.
31. See Cross, supra note 9, at 1469.
32. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1727.

33. See Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of
Legalistic "Remedies" For Trust/Distrust, 4 J. ORG. Sci. 367, 371-72 (1993).
34. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1751-52; Sergio G. Lazzarini et al.,

Order with Some Law: Complementarity Versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 261, 261-64 (2004).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

582

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55: p. 577

unpleasantries. Less risk means lower costs, which translates into a greater
willingness to (cognitively) trust one's counterparty.
Where things get interesting is when we examine the impact of law
and regulation on affective trust.
Affective trust can potentially be supplanted, rather than bolstered, by
the imposition of law and regulation.3 5 In other words, relationships that
were once, or might have become, based upon affective trust, have the
tendency to devolve-once subject to regulation-into relationships that
are arm's length; into relationships that are governed by the letter of the
law, rather than a spirit of trust.3 6
This is because the law has a way of inserting itself between the parties. Consider the common reaction to prenuptial agreements. There's a
sense that the law is intruding upon a relationship where it has no placeupon a relationship grounded upon mutual affection, not on contract law
and legal formalities.
Similarly, in the business world, there's something about closing a
deal with a handshake that simply feels so much better than "have your
lawyer talk to my lawyer."3 7 And the reason that this is so is because the
former situation broadcasts "trust," and the involvement of lawyers broadcasts "distrust."38 Although this may be a bit of an exaggeration, the fundamental point stands: relationships of affective trust are usually typified
by a certain degree of informality-a certain obvious amount of simple
trusting (in other words, trust without verification). 3 9 By replacing this
informality with formalism and paperwork, by introducing law and lawyers, by transforming the "feel" of the relationship, regulation actually begins to transform the relationship itself.
As Simkin and Roth discovered in an important 1993 study:
The adoption of legalistic "remedies" (i.e., institutionalized
mechanisms that mimic legal forms and exceed legal/regulatory
requirements) imposes a psychological and/or an interactional
barrier between the two parties that stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and distance and leads to a need for more
rules. 4 0
35. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1725-26; see also Ribstein, supra note
23, at 559-68.
36. See Lane, supra note 15, at 15-16.
37. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1725-26.
38. See id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 23, at 559-68; cf Paul J. Zak, Values and
Value, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOmy, supra
note 12, at 261, 265 (discussing how rules and policies can crowd out good behavior based simply on norms/an honor system). But see Cross, supra note 9, at 1498
(criticizing "crowding out" theories as not "logical").
39. See Ribstein, supranote 23, at 581; accord George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in
Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAw. 45, 53-60 (2002).
40. Sitkin & Roth, supranote 33, at 369 (citations omitted); see also Mari Sako,
Does Trust Improve Business Performance?, in TRUST WrrHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZA-
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Additionally, law and regulation threaten to choke off the air that is
needed to develop and grow affective trust in the first place. Recall that
"vulnerability" is at the heart of trust. By reducing vulnerability (usually a
good thing) the law reduces the opportunities for parties to prove their
trustworthiness to one another.4 1 If I accidentally leave my wallet in my
office after hours, and the cleaning crew returns it to me the next morning, I've earned quite a bit of trust in the cleaning crew. If, however, company regulation requires that the cleaning crew be supervised, and
accompanied, at all times by an off-duty police officer-well, in that case,
the cleaning crew hasn't earned exactly the same amount of trust in my
book.
In other words, although regulatory micromanagement of a relationship might very well enhance one's confidence in a counterparty on a cognitive level, and with regard to, perhaps, the specific issues under
micromanagement, it interferes with the parties' ability to form broader,
more generalized bonds of trust.

IV. FINANCIAL

REGULATION AND TRUST

Having discussed the importance and nature of trust, we are now prepared to apply that understanding in order to evaluate the wisdom (from a
trust perspective) of the U.S. approach to financial regulation. The three
pillars of financial regulation shall be examined, in broad strokes, in turn:
banking regulation, insurance regulation, and securities regulation.
A.

Banking Regulation

Banks are, arguably, the most heavily regulated financial institutions
in the United States. 4 2 Although a certain degree of flexibility exists
within the American system of banking regulation (in that banks may generally select whether they wish to be subject to state or federal regulators 4 3 ), this flexibility does not permit banks to avoid substantial
regulatory oversight.44 As one commentator put it, "the degree of state
45
and federal regulation is pervasive and thorough."
The panoply of regulations to which banks are subjected was well
summarized by William Lovett:
TIONS,

supra note 15, at 88, 99-100, 104-05. But see Lazzarini, supra note 34, at 264

(rejecting Sitkin and Roth's conclusion).

41. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV.
591, 600 (2001).

42. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competi-

tion: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
595, 605-06 (1999).
43. See Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Is There a Dual Banking System?, 2 J. Bus.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 30, 53 (2008).
44. See id.
45. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION 1 (1999).
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Commercial banking is extensively regulated for potential entrants, chartered bank corporations, and bank holding companies. Banks are subject to financial supervision and regular
examination, with substantial corrective authority for dangerous
practices. Reserve requirements are enforced for banks and
their capital adequacy is an important concern of the regulatory
authorities. The growth of banks, along with their branching, diversification and merger activity has been regulated. Significant
limitations also apply to other bank activities, including lending
limits, insider lending, some restrictions on investments and certain types of deposit liabilities .

. .

. There are disclosure require-

ments and privacy safeguards for borrowers and depositors. 4 6
Indeed, no fewer than five federal agencies are currently involved in
bank regulation, in addition to state regulatory authorities. 4 7
Perhaps even more important than the substantial degree of regulatory oversight to which they are subjected, all nationally chartered banks,
and virtually all other banks, have their deposits insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).48 This insurance covers "all deposit accounts, including checking and savings accounts, money market
deposit accounts and certificates of deposit" up to $250,000 (as of this
writing) .49 In terms of scope, over seventy-five percent of all bank deposits
are covered by this insurance. 5 0 As such, the "federal deposit insurance
program is one of the cornerstones of the U.S. banking system."51
In short, then, for the vast majority of Americans, banking is a low risk
undertaking. Heavy oversight and regulatory requirements exist to ensure
bank integrity and solvency-and even in the event of bank failure, every
dollar of a deposit account (for virtually every bank), up to $250,000, is
fully insured by the federal government.
From a trust perspective, the heavy regulation of American banking
strongly supports the development of cognitive trust. By reducing the risk
46. WiuAm A. LoVE-rT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTTUTIONS LAw 121 (6th
ed. 2005).
47. Namely, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union

Administration. See MALLOY, supra note 45, at 14 n.2. At the time of this writing,

proposals to consolidate the functions of some of these agencies, and to do away
with the OTS and OCC, are under serious consideration.
48. See William B. Glidden, The Regulation of U.S. Banks' OperationsAbroad, 108

L.J. 108, 108 (1991).
49. FDIC, Deposit Insurance Summary, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
deposits/dis/index.html (last visited May 16, 2010).
50. See Andrea M. Maechler & Kathleen M. McDill, Dynamic DepositorDiscipline
in U.S. Banks (FDIC Working Paper, Paper No. 2003-07, 2003), availableat http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/wp2003_07/index.html#fig01.
51. HARDING DE C. WILuAMS, FEDERAL BANKING LAW AND REGULATIONs: A
HANDBOOK FOR LAwYERs 35 (2006).
BANKING
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of banking-to the point of insuring bank deposits-banking regulation
reduces the cost of banking.5 2 Since cognitive trust essentially boils down
to a cost-benefit analysis, 53 this reduced cost engenders a greater degree of
cognitive trust.
But this comes at the expense of affective trust. For, as mentioned,
affective trust ordinarily suffers at the hands of legal rules and regulatory
oversight.54 Legal rules and regulations circumscribing a particular relationship tend to have an interesting psychological effect on the parties to
that relationship: the parties come to view their duties toward one another
as limited to such rules and regulations, displacing the more robust duties
55
engendered by affective trust.
Additionally, banking law's very success at reducing customer vulnerability directly serves to reduce the opportunity of banks to demonstrate
their trustworthiness, for there is simply less room in which banks can maneuver to prove that they can be trusted. Customers know not whether
their bank's "honesty," for example, is truly authentic, or, rather, merely
compelled by regulatory overseers.5 6
Certainly, some room to establish affective trust remains. Banks can,
and often try, to compete upon (among other things) their customer service and general competency. Both areas can fairly be linked to the concept of trust: more satisfied customers probably translate into more
trusting customers. Additionally, even though the banking regulatory apparatus provides a great deal of protection for banking customers, trust
could certainly be earned by those banks whose customers rarely need to
avail themselves of such apparatus for redress.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heavy regulation of banking
suppresses affective trust while fostering cognitive trust. While opportunities to develop affective trust might still remain, these opportunities are
quite limited.
Is this trade-off a matter of concern? Does it effectively amount to a
wash? Less affective trust, but more cognitive trust, equaling the same
amount of overall trust nonetheless?
52. See id. at 47 (observing that federal banking insurance "was responsible for
restoring public confidence in the banking system during the Depression and has
obviously worked since then").
53. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
55. See id.

56. Of course, the customer operating pursuant to cognitive trust cares little
one way or the other; his or her primary concern is simply that something is causing
the bank to behave honestly. That said, there are powerful reasons why it is important to know whether one is truly trustworthy, versus merely appearing to be trustworthy. As I have written elsewhere: "when no one is looking, and when no can
catch us, or when there is no law to hold us accountable, or no other means of
chastisement, the only thing that compels us to do what is right is virtue." Ronald
http://www.
J. Colombo, A Crisis of Character,THE HUFFINGTON POST, May 12, 2009,
62
.html.
huffingtonpost.com/ronaldj-colombo/a-crisis-of-character-b-2025

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

586

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 55: p. 577

Perhaps, but the exchange of affective trust for cognitive trust is not a
wise one. Recall that affective trust is the gold standard of trust.5 7 Affective trust is of distinctively higher quality than cognitive trust.5 8 It inspires
greater sacrifice and cooperation, and weathers bad times and disappointments much better. Cognitive trust has been derided, accurately so, as
"artificial trust" 5 9-the trust that we "buy" via the heavy expense of lawyers, contracts, monitoring, and regulation.
This strongly suggests that, when the possibility for affective trust exists, we take full advantage of that opportunity. We ought to do everything
we reasonably can to nurture and protect that form of trust. One of the
last things we ought to do, all things being equal, is sacrifice that trust for
the inferior substitute of cognitive trust.
Coming back to our question, then: is banking regulation sensible
from a trust-enhancing perspective? Most likely, yes.
For even though banking regulation appears to sacrifice affective
trust for cognitive trust, this sacrifice is largely illusory. And this is because, even if the banking industry were less heavily regulated, it is unlikely that affective trust would develop in plentiful supply.
Recall that affective trust is ordinarily developed within contexts of
shared backgrounds, experiences, and/or cultures.6 0 It often grows
through repeated, interpersonal interaction.6 1 Although scholarship suggests that affective trust may be developed in institutional settings, such
development is an exception and not the rule.6 2
Banks have long been pilloried as the quintessential impersonal institution (a characterization that many have went to great lengths to change
in recent years) 63 With the proliferation of direct deposit accounts, auto57. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
58. See id.
59. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 806-07 (1998), quoted in
FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 147 (linking decline of personal trust in modem society
to growth of professional trust in law, medicine, and banking). More colorful still
is Grant Gilmore's well-known comment on the subject:
Law reflects, but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society....
The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven, there will be
no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. ... The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell, there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed.
Grant Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 110-111 (1977).
60. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
61. See id.
62. SeeJorg Sydow, Understandingthe Constitution of InterorganizationalTrust, in
TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONs, supra note 15, at 31, 32-49.
63. See, e.g., Norizan Mohd Kassim & Adbel Kader Mohommad Ahmed
Abdulla, The Influence of Attraction on Internet Banking: An Extension to the Trust-Relationship Commitment Mode4 24 INT'L J. BANK MKTG. 424, 425 (2006); XEROX, FINANCIAL SERVICES WHITE PAPER 2-6, 14-15 (2008), available at http://www.xerox.com/

downloads/usa/en/xgs/whitepapers/xgs whitepaper financial-services_
customer communications.pdf.
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matic teller machines, and Internet banking, the face-to-face interaction of
customer-to-bank teller is quite yesteryear-compounding the impersonalized nature of retail banking.6 Thus, the prospects for affective trust
would seem quite bleak, aside from the question of regulation. In light of
this, regulatory efforts should not be curtailed for fear of undermining
affective trust. Indeed, robust regulation would seem to be the wisest way
of furthering that trust most likely to exist within the banking industry
(cognitive trust).65 Moreover, the indispensability of a sound banking sys-

tem to modern economies is such that it would be foolish to rely upon the
materialization of affective trust at the expense of the near-certainty of
66
For this reason, the heavy
cognitive trust brought about by regulation.
inevitable.
perhaps,
and,
is
sensible
banking
of
regulation
B.

Insurance Regulation

Like banks, insurance companies constitute a vital pillar of the American economy. In the aggregate, insurance premiums account for approximately ten percent of national income in the United States, and insurance
67
companies hold billions of dollars in assets.
Unlike banking regulation,6 8 and especially unlike securities regula70
This was not inition, 69 insurance regulation is primarily state-based.
tially a matter of design, inasmuch a matter of historical evolution and
market realities.7 1 Nevertheless, as of 1945 at least, with the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the state regulation of insurance is explicitly U.S.
policy: "[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regula72
tion or taxation of such business."
As a matter of state regulation, with variations from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, it is a bit more difficult to summarize the law of insurance
regulation. That said, certain recurring themes and approaches
64. See Lorene Yue, Banking Industry's Embrace Of Technology is Leaving Some
Consumers Cold, DET. FREE PREss, May 13, 1998, at 1E.

65. Which is, after all, one of the primary goals of U.S. banking regulation.

See Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. FDIC, 789 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 as part of a
system to restore public confidence and to safeguard bank deposits through a comprehensive deposit insurance program sponsored and regulated by the national
government.").
66. See LovErr, supra note 46, at 1.
67. See id. at 350.
68. See supra Part IV.A.
69. See infra Part IV.C.
70. See LovErr, supra note 46, at 351.
71. See id. at 354-62.
72. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-FergusonAct of
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 14
(1993).
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abound-especially in light of recent trends toward state uniformity.7 3
This enables the following generalized observations.
In terms of objectives, "[t]he goals of insurance regulation articulated
by most states include fair pricing of insurance, protecting insurance company solvency, preventing unfair practices by insurance companies, and
ensuring availability of insurance coverage." 7 4
To accomplish these objectives, insurance regulation is characterized
by a number of recurring features. Insurance regulators control market
entrants, and require minimum capital and financial reporting requirements of newly chartered insurance companies. 75 Out-of-state companies
cannot automatically do business in a jurisdiction, but must also procure
the approval of in-state regulators.76
Because of the importance of insurer solvency, insurance companies
are restricted in their investment choices, and must generally avoid
"[o]verly bold" risk taking with their assets. 7 7 And in order to protect consumers, insurance companies' rates are regulated, and the products they
offer must include certain standard contracts and features. 7 8
The insurance industry, therefore, is indeed heavily regulated.7 9
That said, it is not as heavily regulated as the banking industry.8 0 Additionally, the resources of state regulators are generally inferior to those of
their federal cousins in banking ("[m]any state insurance departments are
hopelessly underfunded and understaffed and are sometimes unable to
carry out basic regulatory functions adequately, much less oversight of
complex international insurance networks"). 8 ' This serves to loosen the
effective rigor of insurance regulation, and exacerbates the difference between insurance regulation and banking regulation.
Thus, although insurance regulation is certainly a model that prioritizes cognitive trust over affective trust, it does so to a relatively lesser degree than does banking regulation. Can this difference be justified from a
trust perspective? Probably so.
Recall that banking institutions are paradigmatically impersonal-especially with the advent of ATM, telephone, and Internet banking. 82 As
73. See LovETT, supra note 46, at 365.
74. Susan Randall, InsuranceRegulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625,
629 (1999).

75. See LovEr, supra note 46, at 365.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 369.
78. See id. at 371, 376.

79. See id. at 364-65 ("The established system of U.S. insurance regulation is
comprehensive, highly developed, with much technical detail.").
80. See supra Part IV.A.
81. Randall, supra note 74, at 699.

82. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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such, for all their efforts, banks are unlikely to gain much traction in attempts to develop and nurture affective trust.
Insurance companies, however, do enjoy customer relationships of a
more personal nature (in certain contexts). For starters, the very subject
matter of many insurance contracts, ranging from health, to life, to property, touch upon issues close to most people (their well-being and their
homes, for example). With regard to life insurance, for example, a review
of policy options ordinarily includes a discussion of those dearest to the
customer's heart: his or her spouse, children, and other very close family
members. It can involve some rather soul-searching questions, and the
need to confront some rather dreadful, yet potential, scenarios. Discussions such as these provide fertile ground for the development of affective
trust between the customer and his or her insurance agent.8 3
Additionally, it is not uncommon for insurance agents to pursue and
develop long-term relationships with their clients. Periodic visits, or
phone calls, from an agent to review a client's "insurance needs" are fairly
common. Oftentimes, these conversations coincide, or quickly follow, a
major life event: such as a marriage, or the birth or adoption of a child.
This furthers the potential development of affective trust in the customerinsurance agent relationship.
Thus, when compared to banking relationships, insurance relationships would seem to hold out more promise for affective trust. From a
trust perspective, this would counsel in favor of a regulatory regime (for
insurance) that created more room for affective trust to develop. Coincidentally, perhaps, this is exactly the situation. Although heavily regulated,
insurance is less heavily regulated than banking, arguably giving affective
trust (a relatively) greater opportunity to develop.
That said, it must be quickly noted that, certain substantial differences notwithstanding, the impact (from a trust perspective) of the relatively lighter regulatory approach to insurance regulation is likely to be
marginal. For it is unlikely that the consumer of insurance will notice, or
be aware of, any appreciable regulatory differences than a consumer of
banking services. In both contexts, consumers will observe and experience the hallmarks and formalities of a heavily regulated industry. Moreover, in both contexts, consumers are likely to be aware of the existence of a
robust regulatory backdrop-even if such consumers are oblivious to the
details of this regulatory backdrop. Thus, although the insurance industry
might be slightly less regulated than the banking industry (both formally
and, effectively, because of oversight limitations discussed above),84 that

83. Cf Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Issues in the Sale of Life Insurance, 40

& INs. PRAc. L.J. 877, 906 (2005).
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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difference is unlikely to have an impact on trust because it is most likely
imperceptible to the consumer.8 5
C.

Securities Regulation

The most interesting application of trust scholarship to financial regulation occurs within the context of securities regulation. This is because
securities regulation is itself marked by a broad range of regulatory approaches-from highly regulated (as in the case of broker-dealers) 8 6 to
lightly regulated (as in the case of hedge funds).87 The sensibility of this
range will turn on the nature of the relationships impacted by these regulatory approaches.
Although a more thorough treatment of the interplay of trust and
securities regulation will be treated elsewhere, 88 this Article will examine
the issue within four important and representative securities industry
contexts.
1.

Public Offering Regulation
U.S. securities regulation is largely governed by the Securities Act of

1933 (1933 Act) 89 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 90
The 1933 Act focuses primarily on the sale of securities from an issuer to
the public; the 1934 Act focuses primarily on secondary market trading.9 1
Arguably, the defining features of the U.S. approach to financial regulation are on display in the 1933 Act. More specifically, the 1933 Act's
rules governing a public offering of securities shed much light on the philosophy of U.S. financial regulation generally.
In adopting the initial set of federal securities laws for the United
States, the road not taken by Congress was that of merit regulation. 92 Instead, the 1933 Securities Act (and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as
well) embodies a philosophy of "full disclosure."9 3 Pursuant to this philos85. To the extent that a particularly sophisticated individual or entity was fully
aware of this discrepancy in regulatory vigor, then the increased possibilities for
affective trust in the insurance context could materialize.
86. See CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 1:2 (2008).
87. See Thierry Olivier Desmet, UnderstandingHedge Fund Adviser Regulation, 4
Bus. L.J. 1, 13 (2008).
88. See Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and FinancialRegulation 34-56 (Hofstra U.
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-22, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1 481327.
HASTINGS

89. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
90. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
91. See Cheryl Nichols, HR. 2179, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act of 2004: A Testament to Selective FederalPreemption, 31 SUFFOLK TRANsNAT'L L. REv. 533, 545 (2008).
92. I discuss the history and purposes of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934
Securities Exchange Act in Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud
from Economic and Natural Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 122-23 (2007).
93. See id.
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ophy, the government doesn't decide which securities are fit for sale, and
which are unfit (as, say, the Food and Drug Administration does with regard to food and drugs) . Instead, the government, through the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), requires that companies wishing to sell
securities in a public offering make certain detailed, and rather extensive,
disclosures to the public before doing so." More specifically, an issuer
seeking to sell securities in a public offering must, among other things,
ordinarily file a registration statement with the SEC (which immediately
becomes available to the public via the SEC's website), and must deliver to
the investor (or otherwise make available) a prospectus once the securities
are actually purchased.9 6 Once the disclosures are made, it is up to the
investor himself or herself to weigh the merits of the securities offering,
and to decide whether purchasing the securities is wise or unwise. And
since inaccurate or misleading disclosures are worse than no disclosure at
all, the 1933 Securities Act adds to its mandatory disclosure regime important liability and antifraud provisions intended to safeguard the accuracy
and truthfulness of the disclosed information.9 7
Congress's express purpose in enacting the 1933 and 1934 Acts was,
primarily, to restore investor trust and confidence in the securities markets. 98 With regard to cognitive trust at least, the legislation appears to
have hit the mark.
By requiring detailed disclosures, private rights of action, and governmental oversight, public offering regulations reduce investor vulnerability.99 This reduces the cost of trusting an issuer, thereby increasing the
likelihood of cognitive trust.
However, as with banking and insurance regulation, the possibility of
affective trust materializing is diminished because the tight web of regulation leaves little room in which issuers can maneuver to demonstrate their
trustworthiness. The antifraud rules, which reduce investor vulnerability,
simultaneously reduce the opportunity that an issuer has to prove its genuine integrity. An investor knows not whether the issuer's disclosures are
truthful because the issuer is honest, or because the issuer merely wishes
94. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, What We Do, http://www.fda.
gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited May 16, 2010).
95. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 122-23; see also Ripken, supra note 1, at 145,
150-56 ("For the last seventy years, federal securities legislation in general has consistently relied on the philosophy of disclosure as the primary tool for protecting
investors and regulating the securities market.").
96. See Michael McDonough, Death in One Act: The Case For Company Registration, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 563, 566-68 (1997).
97. See id. at 577.
98. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 121.
99. But see Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 491
(2002) (asserting that, within the somewhat analogous context of physician regulation, "[t]he ability to sue one's doctor for negligent mistakes and the authority to
discipline doctors for unprofessional conduct . . . are not plausibly meant to sustain trust or to restore it once it is violated. Instead, they are meant to punish
violations of trust.").
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to avoid legal sanction. Additionally, the very need for such antifraud
rules arguably broadcasts the potential untrustworthiness of issuers.10 0
Even the requirement to make certain disclosures, as innocuous as
that might seem to affective trust, can be problematic from a perspective
favoring the enhancement of affective and generalized trust. For these
disclosures nevertheless constitute a formal, regulatory imposition upon
the issuer-investor relationship, thereby potentially transforming it.101
That said, by opting for a disclosure regime, versus merit-based regulation, Congress intentionally left investors exposed to a significant
amount of obvious vulnerability-even after taking into account forceful
antifraud provisions. This residual vulnerability serves as an opportunity
for the development of some affective trust, but a stumbling block for cognitive trust.102
For affective trust can potentially be developed via a process-based
route in which one's placement of trust in another is honored and rewarded, time after time.103 The vulnerability inherent in an investor's
purchasing of securities from an issuer furnishes the room that is needed
for the issuer to demonstrate its trustworthiness. As forecasts and predictions prove accurate, and as the issuer continues to conduct its affairs with
integrity and competence, an investor can grow to develop an amount of
affective trust in the issuer. Such development of trust over time between
an issuer and investors is of tremendous value to each: the company will
be well positioned to raise money via subsequent public offerings more
easily, and less expensively, and investors will be able to view the company's subsequent offerings with less skepticism and doubt. 104
In short, the regulatory approach to public offerings largely favors
cognitive trust over affective trust. At the same time, the approach certainly carves out some space for the development of affective trust-at the
expense of some cognitive trust. Is the approach sensible? It would seem
SO.
With rare exception, investment decisions are based on cognitive, not
affective, trust.105 An investor's trust in a company is not ordinarily emotionally or morally generated, but rather is developed in a calculated fashion. All things considered, factors going into whether an investor trusts a
company to perform well include its past performance, its management
100. Cf id. at 492 (observing that medical malpractice law "casts seeds of
doubt about all physicians").
101. Cf id. at 489 (observing that informed consent law operates "possibly to
the detriment of trust" between patient and physician).
102. See Hill & O'Hara, supra note 19, at 1756.
103. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
104. See PATIIcIA L. GUINN, INVESTORS ARE DEMANDING MORE TRANSPARENT FiNANCIAL REPORTING FROM INSURERS . . . BUT COMPANIES WILL BENEFIT Too 3
(2002), http://www.iisonline.org/pdf/Guinn%20%20-%20TG-SingaporeWhite
Paper.pdf.
105. See Michael Ferrary, Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending
Activities, 31 J. Socio-EcoN. 673, 678 (2003).
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team, the quality of its products and services, its competitive environment,
and the regulatory landscape. Management integrity may very well be a
concern-but most likely, not in an emotional, or morally driven way, but
rather as simply another (albeit an important) factor in the mix. Indeed,
it is difficult for affective trust, which is primarily interpersonal in nature,
to develop between an individual and an institution-especially an institution as far removed, and with as little contact with the investor, as an issuer
of securities (for several intermediaries will separate the issuer from the
ultimate investor, including, most likely, an underwriter, a dealer, and a
broker; it is highly probable that the investor will have absolutely no direct
contact with the issuer at all during the time in which he or she makes an
investment decision).106
On balance, therefore, it would seem as though public offering regulation comports well with our understanding of trust in that it heavily regulates an area where trust is largely coguitive in nature.
Interestingly, the regulation does not go as far as it could in this direction, but, owing to its disclosure-based approach (versus a heavier-handed
merit-based approach), actually allows some room for affective trust to develop as well, perhaps allowing certain exceptional issuers an opportunity
to reap the benefits of this potentiality. 0 7
2.

Private Offering Regulation

In contrast to the regulation of public offerings under the 1933 Securities Act is the manner in which private offerings are regulated. Largely
codified by Regulation D under the 1933 Act, private offerings permit the
sale of securities, under certain conditions, without the need to file a registration statement with the SEC or prepare a prospectus.10 8 Indeed, when
selling securities to an "accredited investor" (an investor "capable of fending for him/herself' due to his or her presumed sophistication, as determined by factors such as income and net worth), 10 9 there are no
information requirements whatsoever.110
Additionally, since no registration statement, and no prospectus, is
prepared in connection with a private offering, certain antifraud and liability provisions applicable to public offerings are inapplicable to private

106. See Sydow, supra note 62, at 32-49.
107. But see Ripken, supra note 1, at 187-88 (arguing that cognitive biases undermine investors' ability to make rational investment decisions, which suggests
that enhancement of trust in this area might not be entirely beneficial).
108. See Abigail Arms, The PrivatePlacementAlternative to a Public Offering, 1734

P.L.I. CoRP. 55, 61, 64 (2009).
109. See id. at 62.
110. See id. at 64.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

594

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55: p. 577

offerings.1"' This removes important means by which investors can protect themselves when purchasing securities in a private offering.1 12
Thus, in comparison to a public offering, a private offering does not
require the dissemination of circumscribed information (via the preparation of a registration statement, a prospectus, or any similar document) to
accredited investors.' 1 3 And whatever communications are made to the
investor, the inaccuracies in such communications can only give rise to
liability within a reduced set of circumstances.
In short, therefore, private offerings are less heavily regulated than
public offerings.11 4 Although this difference has been justified on a number of grounds," 5 can it be justified on grounds relating to the issue of
trust? I believe it can.
A public offering and a private offering differ factually in a number of
important respects.'" 6 Most relevant to the present analysis, a private "offering is more likely to be . . . 'characterized by personal contact between

the issuer and offerees free of public advertising or intermediaries such as
investment bankers or securities exchanges."'17 A second important
characteristic of private offerings is that of (oftentimes) a pre-existing relationship between the investor and the issuer.118
Unlike a public offering, then, a private offering often takes place in a
context within which affective trust is more likely to develop." 9 Interpersonal relationships and communications are conducive to such trust,120
and such relationships and communications are often found among the
parties to a private offering.
Similarly, given the relationships and degree of direct communication
between the parties, an investor's trust in a private offering issuer could
actually be generalized. He or she may actually have developed a "feel" for
111. See id. at 86.

112. Certain other avenues of liability remain (primarily, § 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder), but these avenues lack many of the features that make civil liability under the 1933 Securities
Act so helpful to aggrieved plaintiffs. See Nelson S. Ebaugh, Remedies for Defrauded
Purchasers of Oil and Gas Interests Under the Securities Laws, 1 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 51, 60-61 (2006).
113. Some information must be provided to non-accredited investors, but still
less than that which an investor in a public offering would receive. See Arms, supra
note 108, at 62.
114. The same could be said, of course, of private placements under Rule
144A, but in the interest of time and space Rule 144A shall not be independently
evaluated in this Article. See id. at 86.
115. See Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMoRY
L.J. 67, 72 (1989).
116. See id. at 77-79.
117. Id. at 77-78 (quoting Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900
(5th Cir. 1977)).
118. See id. at 78.
119. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
120. See Sydow, supra note 62, at 32-49.
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the issuing corporation (through repeated contacts with its agents, and a
relationship over time), such that he or she genuinely trusts in the integrity, honesty, and values of that organization.
The way in which private offerings are regulated appears to favor affective trust over cognitive trust. The lack of regulation (relatively speaking) does less to bolster the development of cognitive trust than a more
robust regulatory regime possibly could, but, at the same time, creates ample space for affective trust to develop. Thus, the regulatory approach to
private offerings appears to be the photographic negative to the regulatory
approach to public offerings.
This divergence is justifiable given the nature of private offerings, and
given the recommended preference for affective trust over cognitive
trust. 1 2 1 For a greater potential for affective and generalized trust exists
within the context of private offerings versus public offerings, presenting a
greater societal opportunity: an opportunity to realistically further affective trust. Thus, it would seem that our regulation of offerings, both public and private, strikes the correct balance, from a trust-favoring
perspective.
3.

Undenrwiters and Due Diligence

Underwriters and due diligence are components of securities offerings-especially public offerings. Nevertheless, their importance is such
to merit separate consideration.
The underwriter, among other things, serves an important "gatekeeping" role in the securities offering process. 122 For unlike the issuer, it is
ordinarily the underwriter (invariably an investment bank) that enjoys
contacts and relationships with the investing public-either directly or indirectly through broker-dealers. 12 3 Thus, if the issuer's securities are to be
sold, it will usually be a function of the expertise, ability, and credibility of
the investment banks underwriting the offering.12 4 In short, the underwriter's reputation, which serves as a shorthand for its expertise, ability,
and credibility, is critical.' 2 5 As Ronald Gilson and Reiner Kraakman have
explained:
It is in this setting that the critical role of the investment banker
[underwriter] as a reputational intermediary becomes clear. In
essence, the investment banker rents the issuer its reputation.
The investment banker represents to the market (to whom it,
and not the issuer, sells the security) that it has evaluated the
121. See Lane, supra note 15, at 23.
122. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 620 (1984).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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issuer's product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its
reputation on the value of the innovation. 12 6
"Reputation" is, of course, closely related to trust. The more deeply
and widespread the trust is in an individual or organization, the greater
his, her, or its reputation is likely to be. It is, therefore, critically important for underwriters to earn the trust of the investing public. How well do
the securities laws enable underwriters to earn this trust?
The overriding provisions regulating underwriting conduct in a public offering are Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act.127
These sections give investors private rights of action in the event of a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement or prospectus.12 8
This liability extends to underwriters involved in the underwriting
process.1 29
Although neither Section 11 nor Section 12(a) (2) requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate scienter, and thus may result in strict liability, it does provide defendant underwriters with an important means of escaping liability.1so For if an underwriter can establish that it engaged in sufficient
"due diligence" (under Section 11), or employed "reasonable care"
(under Section 12(a) (2)), it will be absolved of liability under those Sections.13 1 Fortunately (for analytical purposes, at least) courts have held
that the standards for what amounts to "due diligence" and "reasonable
care" are roughly equivalent, and hence I shall not address these defenses
separately, but rather collectively under the title of "due diligence."1 3 2
To prevail upon a due diligence defense, an underwriter must establish that:
[it] had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to
126. Id.; see also Lawrence Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
MINN. L. REv. 323, 328 (2007).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
128. See id.
129. See id.; Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters' ContinuousDue DiligenceAfter Worldcom, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 2001, 2010-11
(2009).
130. See Leahy, supra note 129, at 2011.
131. See id. at 2011-12. Underwriters also have a "reliance defense" under Sec-

Gatekeepers, 92

tion 11 with regard to expertised portions of the registration statement. See id.
Further still, if fraud is alleged, plaintiffs (and the SEC) could pursue an action
against underwriters pursuant to Section 10 of the 1934 Act, and the SEC has the
additional option of proceeding against the underwriters under Section 17 of the
1933 Act.
132. See id.
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be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading.13 3
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that whether an investigation was
reasonable invites a negligence analysis. 134
Although efforts have been made to more explicitly define what constitutes due diligence,1 3 5 there remains "a relative paucity of judicial authority on how a defendant can successfully establish his due diligence
defense under Sections 11 and 12."136 Thus, for these critical players in
the securities markets (underwriters), the circumstances under which they
can be held liable for material misstatements and omissions in offering
documentation remain murky. It should be added that if fraud is alleged
by plaintiffs (which is often the case), heightened pleading standards
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) make
it particularly difficult for a plaintiff to pursue an action against an underwriter (or any other securities fraud defendant).13 7
From a trust perspective, it would seem as though existing regulation
provides underwriters with ample room with which to earn the trust they
so critically need within the industry. Their underwriting work is not circumscribed in detail, but rather subject to a general, and fairly low, standard-approximating negligence.' 3 8 Moreover, in light of the PSLRA,
investors victimized by securities fraud will find it particularly difficult to
obtain relief from underwriter (and indeed, all non-issuer) defendants. 3 9
Whether this lack of regulatory support for trust in underwriters is
good public policy (from a trust perspective) depends, it would seem,
upon the nature of the underwriting-investor relationship. As with our
analysis of the regulatory approach toward public versus private offerings, 14 0 the pivotal inquiry is the degree to which trust in underwriters is
affective versus cognitive in nature.141
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A).
134. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
135. See, e.g., In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Christian A. Young, Looking Back on WorldCom: Addressing Underniters'Due
Diligence in Shelf Registration Offerings and the Need for Reform, 40 SuFFOLK U. L. REV.
521, 54748 (2007).
136. Jonathan K. Youngwood, Due Diligence as a Defense in Securities Litigation,
1746 P.L.I. CoRP. 57, 71 (2009).
137. Alexis Brown Stokes, In Pursuitof the Naked Short, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1,
23-32 (2009).
138. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 86-121 and accompanying text.
141. Here we are presented with an interesting complexity, in that the relationship between and among underwriters, and other market professionals, may
very well exhibit a different blend of trust than the relationship between underwriters and the investing public at large. This complexity need not detain us, however,
because the relationship we have been examining in this Part is that between the
underwriters and investors, and thus the following analysis will limit itself to that
same relationship.
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It would appear as though the relationship of an underwriter to the
investing public is primarily cognitive in nature. As with issuers involved
in public offerings, the underwriter is ordinarily removed by a step or two
from the ultimate investor. The investor's trust in an underwriter seems
more like an investor's trust in an issuer in a public offering: reliance on
its technical skills and capability to fulfill its obligations professionally and
competently. Emotion and a shared sense of values do not seem to play a
predominant role here. Likewise, the trust in an underwriter's reputation
is more akin to confidence in its ability to effectively investigate the issuer
whose securities are being offered for sale-and less akin to a generalized
convergence in the values and morals of the underwriting firm.
Given, therefore, that trust in underwriters is most likely cognitive in
nature, and thus of the forms most susceptible to enhancement via regulation, it would seem as though (from a strictly trust-enhancing point of
view) additional regulation of underwriters could be helpful. Measures
taken to enhance underwriter liability, or more carefully circumscribe the
conduct that constitutes due diligence, would most likely increase, rather
than decrease, trust in underwriters from an investor's vantage point.
4.

Secondary Market Trading and Rule 10b-5

The vast majority of securities trading activity occurs in the secondary
market-that is, between investors rather than between issuers and investors.1 4 2 Not surprisingly, then, of paramount importance to most investors is the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (which focuses chiefly on the
secondary market), and not the 1933 Securities Act (which focuses chiefly
on the primary market and underwriting of securities). 143
Since secondary market investors trade anonymously, any trust and
confidence factoring into their decisions to trade (aside from any trust
and confidence in their brokers) is largely grounded upon the market
itself.14 4 Prominent among the efforts of Congress and the SEC to foster
trust in the secondary trading markets are the bans on fraudulent, manipulative, and insider trading.145
Pursuant to Section 10 of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, it is unlawful to employ a manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 146 "Manipulative" has
142. See Steven M.H. Wallman, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital
Formation and Regulatory Processes, 962 P.L.I. CoRP. 417, 544 (1996).
143. See id.; see also supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
144. See Michelle N. Comeau, The Hidden Contradiction Within Insider Trading
Regulation, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1275, 1280-82 (2006).

145. See 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 103 (2009). There are undoubtedly
other important regulatory provisions governing the secondary market, including,
but not limited to, the periodic disclosure requirements. These do not implicate
"trust" as directly and as profoundly, and hence they shall not be addressed here.
146. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006);
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
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been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as a "term of art," encompassing "the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate
securities prices."1 4 7 And "deceptive device[s]" are generally practices in
which the purchase or sale of a security is accomplished via the communi148
cation of a materially misleading misstatement or omission.
Except for the relatively rare instance of a face-to-face purchase of
securities between two secondary market actors, Section 10 and Rule lOb-5
instill trust and confidence by serving to protect the integrity of securities
prices. 14 9 By (hopefully) reducing the occurrence of fraud and manipulation, Section 10 and Rule lOb-5 provide comfort to the investor purchasing a security over an exchange-comfort in the fact that the price paid
for the security is a function of its value, as best estimated, and not the
150
result (or less likely the result) of fraud and manipulation.
The ban on insider trading works similarly. Again, assuming a typical
secondary market transaction (and not a face-to-face sale), the investor
does not know with whom he or she is actually trading. That said, it has
long been assumed (and probably rightly so) that investors would be less
willing to trade if they felt as though the market were "rigged" by insiders-individuals who knew exactly when to buy and when to sell, thanks to
access to information unavailable to the common investor.' 5 1 As with a
ban on manipulation and fraud, a ban on insider trading promotes a sense
of fairness in the securities markets (or so the supporters of the insider
trading ban reasonably assert) .152
Beyond the bans on fraudulent, manipulative, and insider trading,
the secondary markets are subject to a host of other regulatory requirements. Prominent among these requirements are those promulgated by
self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the New York Stock Exchange, which impose their own layer of rules and regulations upon the
secondary trading markets, enforced and overseen by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).15 3 And broker-dealers, the key financial intermediaries through which the vast majority of investors trade in
54
the secondary market, are themselves heavily regulated.'
147. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
148. See Todd G. Cosenza, Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 64 Bus. LAw. 59, 61-62 (2008).
149. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 1125 (5th ed. 2005); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and
UnwarrantedExtension of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359,
366-68 (1995).

150. See Herzog, supra note 149, at 373-74.
151. Carol B. Swanson, ReinventingInsider Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates The MisappropriationTheory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1157, 1161-64 (1997).
152. See id.

153. See Cheryl Nichols, Mutual Recognition Based On Substituted Compliance: An
Integral Component of the SEC's Mandate, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 18-21
(2008).
154. See KIRscH, supra note 86, § 1:2.
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From a trust perspective, it seems as though the regulatory approach
to secondary market trading is helpful and sensible. It is difficult to imagine the development of high-quality affective trust in the context of secondary market trading.15 5 Affective trust is most commonly found between
individuals, and less so between an individual and an institution-especially an institution as intangible as "the securities markets." 156
Thus, with little affective trust to be sacrificed, heavy regulation in this
area does not seem ill-advised.
Conversely, since the trust in this area is likely to be of the cognitive
variety, regulation can have a trust-enhancing effect here.' 57 Investor
trust in the institutions and actors involved in secondary market trading
fundamentally boils down to confidence in those institutions and actors to
correctly process trade requests-and in a manner devoid of fraud, duplicity, and incompetence. Regulation governing these trades, institutions,
and actors can very well heighten that confidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

Trust is a critical ingredient in healthy financial markets, economies,
and societies. Policy makers are correctly concerned with taking action to
protect and/or restore trust-especially in times when events and circumstances imperil trust.
Unfortunately, good intentions and well-meaning policy prescriptions
do not guarantee favorable results.15 8 Indeed, perhaps counter-intuitively,
regulation designed to shore up trust can actually serve to undermine
trust. The critical determinant here is the nature of trust in question.
Fortunately, whether by chance or design, financial regulation in the
United States generally comports well with what we know about trust.
Trust relationships most amenable to regulatory improvement (namely,
relationships of cognitive trust), are generally the most heavily regulated.
Trust relationships that are least amenable to regulatory improvement,
and/or exhibit a potential to generate and operate upon higher quality
versions of non-regulatory trust (namely, relationships of affective trust),
are generally the least heavily regulated.1 5 9
155. See Ferrary, supra note 105 and accompanying text.
156. See id.
157. See Hall, supra note 99, at 469, 498-507; see also Cross, supra note 9, at
1483; Williamson, supra note 21, at 475-78.
158. Cf OxFoRD DicriONARY OF QUOTA-IONs 630:12 (Elizabeth Knowles ed.,
6th ed. 2004).

159. I strongly suspect that this happy confluence of regulatory structure and
trust springs, in part, from design-even if unintentional. It is not particularly
difficult to appreciate the fact that some relationships require more rather than
less supervision in order to thrive, and that other relationships, conversely, require
less rather than more supervision to thrive. Appreciation of this phenomenon
among policy makers could very well explain the varying gradations of regulatory
approaches to different component parts of the financial services industry.
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Since the financial services industry is, generally speaking, impersonal
and driven by economic concerns, cognitive trust (based upon calculative,
cost-benefit analysis), rather than affective trust (based upon emotion and
shared backgrounds, experiences, and values) generally prevails. Consequently, the high degree of regulation that characterizes the financial services industry is sensible.
There are, of course, exceptions to this. There are pockets and
niches in the world of financial services where affective trust does exist, or
could be expected to exist. And there are a range of contexts in between:
some places where affective trust is more likely to develop, and others
where affective trust is less likely to develop. Interestingly, and gladly, existing regulation generally tracks these nuances well from a trust perspective; the hand of regulation is relatively heavier where appropriate, and
relatively lighter where appropriate.
It would be wise to preserve this salutary state of affairs. As our policy
1
makers continue to confront a crisis that some wish not to "waste," 6e let
us hope that their policy prescriptions avoid undoing what generations
past have seemingly done well. Let us hope that they avoid deregulating
those areas within the financial services industry where regulation serves
trust most well (those areas characterized by the lowest potential to realize
the benefits of affective trust). Similarly, let us hope that they avoid regulating (or avoid regulating to a greater degree), those areas where regulation threatens to harm trust more than help trust (those areas
characterized by the greatest potential to realize the benefits of affective
trust). At a bare minimum, let us hope that, if acting in the name of trust,
policy makers at least take into account the likely effects of their actions
on trust, in light of over a decade of scholarship on the subject.
160. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/us/politics/10
obama.html.
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